In Washington, where discussions concerning Russia frequently revolve around a specific name, political science doctoral candidate Suzanne Freeman is actively redefining the landscape of authority in autocratic nations. Her research challenges existing narratives about Vladimir Putin’s Russia, urging us to look beyond the individual to comprehend the structure that created him.

“The conventional view is that Putin is the architect of Russia’s governance system and its global interactions,” Freeman articulates. “My argument is that Putin is a byproduct of a system rather than its creator, and that his actions align closely with the foreign policy beliefs of the institution in which he was trained.”

This institution — the KGB and its successor entities — occupies the core of Freeman’s dissertation, which investigates how authoritarian intelligence agencies influence their own nations’ foreign policy decision-making processes, particularly regarding military action.

Dismantling the “yes men” narrative

Previous scholarship has depended on a simplistic depiction of intelligence agencies within authoritarian regimes. “The prevailing notion that I’m contesting is essentially that autocrats surround themselves with ‘yes’ individuals,” Freeman states. She highlights that this perspective largely arises from a notable Soviet misstep, when intelligence officers were too intimidated to challenge Stalin’s belief that Nazi Germany wouldn’t invade in 1941.

Freeman’s research unveils a considerably more intricate reality. Through extensive archival studies, including newly released documents from Lithuania, Moldova, and Poland, she illustrates that intelligence agencies in authoritarian governments possess distinct foreign policy interests and actively endeavor to promote them.

“These intelligence organizations are driven by their institutional interests, aiming to endure and maintain power within and beyond their borders,” Freeman asserts.

When an international situation jeopardizes those interests, authoritarian intelligence agencies might disrupt the policy process by employing strategies that Freeman has categorized in an innovative typology: indirect manipulation (altering gathered intelligence), direct manipulation (misrepresenting evaluated intelligence), preemption in the field (unauthorized actions that change a foreign crisis), and coercion (threats against political leadership).

“By intervene, I refer to acting in a manner that is inappropriate concerning their mandate,” Freeman elucidates. This mandate includes providing policy recommendations. “However, at times intelligence agencies seek to enhance their policy advice’s appeal by altering information,” she observes. “They may modify the facts on the ground or, in rare instances, apply pressure on policymakers.”

From Soviet archives to contemporary Russia

Instead of focusing solely on modern Russia, Freeman employs historical case studies of the Soviet Union’s KGB. Her investigation into this agency’s policy interventions encompasses eight foreign policy crises between 1950 and 1981, including uprisings in Eastern Europe, the Sino-Soviet border conflict, and the Soviet-Afghan War.

Her findings contradict earlier assumptions that the agency predominantly served as a passive information provider. “The KGB has always been significant for Soviet foreign policy and provided policy advice on what they believed should be done,” she explains. Intelligence agencies were particularly inclined to pursue policy interventions when confronted with a “dual threat:” domestic unrest ignited by foreign crises alongside the eroding of intelligence networks abroad.

This institutional motivation, rather than merely conforming to a leader’s preferences, driven policy recommendations in predictable manners.

Freeman observes striking similarities to Russia’s recent maneuvers in Ukraine. “This dual organizational threat closely resembles the challenge that the KGB faced in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland from 1980 to 1981,” she elucidates. After 2014, Ukrainian intelligence reforms weakened Russian intelligence networks within the country — a significant organizational threat to Russia’s security framework.

“Between 2014 and 2022, this network deteriorated,” Freeman notes. “We know that Russian intelligence had connections with a polling firm in Ukraine, collecting data indicating that 84 percent of the populace would perceive them as occupiers, with nearly half of the Ukrainian population willing to defend Ukraine.” Despite these findings, officers recommended military action in Ukraine nonetheless.

This trend mirrors the KGB’s push for an invasion of Afghanistan through the manipulation of intelligence — an analogy that aids in understanding Russia’s foreign policy choices beyond merely Putin’s personal inclinations.

Scholarly investigative work

Freeman’s research innovations have enabled her to access previously untapped resources. “From a methodological standpoint, it’s new archival material, but it’s also archival material from regional areas of a country, rather than just the center,” she clarifies.

In Moldova, she analyzed previously classified KGB documents: vast amounts of newly available and unstructured records that provided insights into how anti-Soviet sentiment during foreign crises influenced the KGB.

Freeman’s determination to seek out sources beyond central archives sets her approach apart, especially valuable as direct research in Russia becomes increasingly challenging. “Individuals wishing to study Russia or the Soviet Union who are unable to visit Russia can still discover valuable insights, even about the central state, from these other nations and areas.”

From Boston to Moscow to MIT

Freeman was raised in Boston in an academically inclined, science-focused family; both of her parents were immunologists. Diverging from this path, she was captivated by history, particularly Russian and Soviet history, starting in high school.

“I was always intrigued by the Soviet Union and the reasons behind its collapse, but I never received a clear answer from my educators,” Freeman says. “This truly motivated me to explore further and solve that mystery on my own.”

At Columbia University, she majored in Slavic studies and earned a master’s degree from the School of International and Public Affairs. Her undergraduate thesis investigated Russian military reform, a topic that gained renewed significance following Russia’s 2014 incursion into Ukraine.

Before embarking on her doctoral studies at MIT, Freeman was involved with the Russia Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College, exploring Russian military strategy and doctrine. There, surrounded by scholars with political science and history doctorates, she discovered her calling.

“I resolved that I wanted to be in an academic environment where I could conduct research I believed would be of value,” she recalls.

Bridging academia and public enlightenment

Beyond her core research, Freeman has established her position as an innovator in war-gaming methodologies. Along with fellow PhD student Benjamin Harris, she co-founded the MIT Wargaming Working Group, which has forged a partnership with the Naval Postgraduate School to unite mid-career military officers and scholars for annual simulations.

Their efforts on war-gaming as a pedagogical method culminated in a peer-reviewed publication in PS: Political Science & Politics titled “Crossing a Virtual Divide: Wargaming as a Remote Teaching Tool.” This research illustrates that war games are effective instruments for active learning even in remote formats and can aid in bridging the civil-military divide.

When not engaged in research, Freeman serves as a guide at the International Spy Museum in Washington. “I believe public education is crucial — plus they have a plethora of truly fascinating KGB artifacts,” she states. “I felt that working at the Spy Museum would allow me to continue contemplating my research in a more enjoyable manner and hopefully assist me in explaining some of these concepts to individuals who aren’t academics.”

Examining beyond singular leaders

Freeman’s work provides essential insights for policymakers who too frequently concentrate solely on autocratic leaders, neglecting the institutional frameworks surrounding them. “I aspire to offer individuals a new perspective through which to assess the policymaking process,” she states. “The intelligence agency and the type of guidance it furnishes to political leadership can hold significant weight.”

As tensions with Russia remain, Freeman believes her research offers a vital framework for grasping state conduct beyond individual personalities. “If you’re going to negotiate and confront these authoritarian regimes, considering the leadership beyond the autocrat seems imperative.”

Currently finalizing her dissertation as a predoctoral fellow at George Washington University’s Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, Freeman aims to contribute pivotal scholarship on Russia’s role in international security and inspire others to tackle complex geopolitical inquiries with systematic research skills.

“In Russia and other autocratic nations, the intelligence system may persist long after a single leader’s term ends,” Freeman emphasizes. “This indicates that we must concentrate not on the individuals who capture the headlines, but on the institutions that mold them.”