Can Europe safeguard itself against a nuclear-capable Russia?

Numerous European leaders fear that they can no longer depend on the U.S. for the extensive defensive assistance they have relied upon for decades now that President Donald Trump, a long-time opponent of NATO and the European Union, is back in office.

In this revised dialogue, Richard D. Hooker Jr., a senior collaborator at the Belfer Center’s Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School, elaborates on what Europe must do to prepare for this new circumstance.

A distinguished veteran, Hooker has held national security positions during the Trump, George W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George H.W. Bush presidencies and has been on the faculty of the National Defense University, National War College, and the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

---

You recently indicated that Europe must strengthen its own defense as it is no longer a focal point for the U.S. How does the situation appear at this time?

I definitely believe the risk to European security is significantly heightened. The underlying reason is the impression that the U.S. is retreating and, in certain aspects, cooperating with Russian President Vladimir Putin. This emboldens Putin while discouraging the Europeans, resulting in both positive and negative outcomes.

For many years, the U.S. has aimed to suppress any ideas of European strategic independence. We always presumed we would be the primary provider of security in Europe, and we appreciated leading NATO. Consequently, there has been sluggish progress in establishing a distinct or autonomous defense capability in Europe.

An article in The Wall Street Journal suggests that Europe possesses vastly more military assets and wealth compared to Russia. Yet, when scrutinizing that statement closely, there are significant issues with that assertion.

The first issue is that military readiness across Europe is rather low, even among the key nations — the French, the British, the Germans, and the Italians. They would find it challenging to deploy a single army combat division within 60 to 90 days. Deploying a second would likely take even longer.

The U.K. managed 66 divisions during World War I; it would struggle to mobilize even one in 90 days to defend the Baltic states. That indicates a considerably low state of readiness.

Why isn’t it stronger?

The armed forces throughout Europe have significantly diminished. Over the past 30 years, they have transitioned to volunteer-based militaries, which are markedly more costly, and you cannot generate reserves with volunteer forces. Moreover, the situation in Ukraine has demonstrated that modern warfare, unsurprisingly, leads to substantial casualties and consumes vast amounts of resources. This presents a challenge.

However, the fundamental concern lies with what we refer to as the enablers. These are the essential capabilities that facilitate actual combat operations. This includes logistics, air defense, medical support, and artillery at the corps level — those necessary elements are largely lacking in Europe.

Thus, it becomes exceedingly difficult to assemble a military force that can deter or confront the Russian Federation in a significant conflict because these capabilities are either non-existent or highly diminished.

Now, the overarching concern is that if the U.S. retreats and withdraws its nuclear protection, Europe has no real alternative for that scenario. There simply isn’t one.

This would place enormous pressure on European nations, especially those in the east, as Putin could threaten to deploy tactical nuclear weapons, and there would be no deterrent against that. The only response comes from the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Some argue that, in practice, that umbrella has already been withdrawn.

“If the U.S. disengages and withdraws its nuclear umbrella, there’s really no answer in Europe for that.”

Should Europe be concerned that the U.S. nuclear umbrella has been dismantled?

Has it already been dismantled? I’m uncertain. Is it dependable? I would doubt it.

If Putin were to threaten or actually utilize tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine or, hypothetically, in Estonia, would the administration counter with its own nuclear threats? Personally, I have reservations. During the first 18 months of the Trump administration, I was the senior NATO representative, a role fraught with discomfort, and I harbor doubts. I’ll conclude my thoughts there.

What are Europe’s major defensive deficiencies that impair its strategic independence?

First and foremost, naturally, is the nuclear issue.

Secondly, they lack adequately high-level formations. While they have numerous corps headquarters, they do not function as true corps headquarters. They lack the artillery, air defense, engineers, and essential resources needed to engage at the corps level.

Thirdly, the readiness of the formations they possess is significantly low, preventing them from deploying substantial forces in 14 days as the U.S. can.

It is easy to consider Europe as a singular entity, but that is a misconception. It is composed of 44 distinct political entities, each perceiving the world somewhat differently.

The nations along the eastern front share a common perspective. The Poles, the Baltic states, and the Nordics all border Russia. They are investing considerable resources; reinstating conscription; and improving continuously. They recognize the global landscape for what it truly is. All theother countries, not as much.

Do you believe that European leaders are sincerely driven to take action?

I believe it is in progress. I truly do. However, it’s not the type of issue that can be resolved quickly.

A clear indication is that military expenditure continues to increase in numerous regions. Not in every corner of Europe — there remain several significant nations that don’t even reach 2 percent. Yet, the major players have all committed to, “We will strive for 3 percent,” and their financial plans appear to be expanding.

As a whole, the Europeans attained the 2 percent goal in 2024, and they have been augmenting their spending considerably over the past four or five years, yet it hasn’t yet converted into genuine capability.

So many individuals, including specialists, merely echo this phrase that “the Europeans aren’t investing sufficiently.” In reality, they invest over four times what Russia does on defense. Russia’s expenditure was approximately $125 billion — to the best of our knowledge — in 2024, while the European allies invested about $500 billion, which is substantial.

Thus, I don’t view expenditure as the primary concern. The manner in which that money is utilized is the core issue.

Which nations possess nuclear armaments, and might others consider acquiring them in response to the evolving situation?

The British have around 400 deployable warheads. These are essentially strategic warheads, supported by three ballistic missile submarines.

The French have roughly the same quantity deployed similarly. These can threaten the ten largest cities in Russia. These are strategic arms; their intention is not to eliminate Russian missile silos.

The Russians possess more than ten times that number of warheads. Are those deterrents effective for those countries? I would think probably yes. Could they, or would they, expand their nuclear protection to neighboring countries or allies? I’m skeptical about that.

There has been talk in Germany regarding establishing a nuclear capacity, but it appears evident that the Germans are not pursuing that.

I wouldn’t be astonished if the Poles were contemplating this. The Ukrainians, who do have sophisticated technology and previously possessed nuclear weapons, might consider developing some form of nuclear capability. Beyond those scenarios, I simply don’t anticipate it.

Are there any measures Europe can implement promptly to safeguard itself?

Firstly: They could reinstate conscription, as this allows for a rapid expansion of forces and creates reserves.

Secondly: It is particularly challenging to transport forces across Europe. This issue is termed military mobility. Whenever you cross a national boundary, or even a regional boundary, you face checkpoints. There are inconsistencies with rail gauges throughout Europe, so you could reach Poland and then need to unload everything and transfer it to a different train. Thus, military mobility poses a significant challenge.

Thirdly: Interoperability, which refers to our ability to collaborate effectively on the battlefield, remains a substantial hurdle.

Not all Allies can communicate securely on the battlefield, nor can they exchange data securely due to their varying systems.

And fourthly, simply be prepared. You must take the issue seriously and confront it. I do believe they are becoming more earnest in their approach. The question is how swiftly they can accomplish this, and if there will be increased Russian aggression on European soil before they reach that point.